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 In this discrimination action, plaintiff Dorothy E. Daniels 
appeals from an order for summary judgment entered on 
November 7, 2013, in favor of her former employer, the School 
District of Philadelphia (“SDP”).  Daniels alleged in her 
complaint that SDP violated the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et 
seq.; and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 951 et seq., both substantively and by retaliating 
against her because she opposed what she believed was SDP’s 
discriminatory conduct in violation of the acts.  Although Daniels 
was completely unsuccessful in the District Court, we address 
only her retaliation claim as she does not raise any other issue on 
this appeal.  We conclude that Daniels did not provide sufficient 
evidence in opposition to SDP’s motion for summary judgment to 
support a conclusion that SDP acted with a retaliatory animus 
with respect to her.  Therefore, we will affirm the order for 
summary judgment. 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 In this opinion, we set forth undisputed facts and recite the 
facts in dispute in a light most favorable to Daniels as the 
nonmoving party.  See McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP., 494 
F.3d 418, 424 (3d Cir. 2007).  Thus, we are not making findings 
of fact for any purpose beyond these proceedings. 
  A.  Daniels’s Background 
 Daniels is an African-American educator born on January 
2, 1950.  She has a masters degree in elementary education and is 
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certified as a reading specialist.  From 2003 to 2008, Daniels 
worked as a guest teacher with Kelly Educational Staffing, and 
had a good relationship with the principals of the schools to 
which she was assigned.  
 In October 2008, following the end of Daniels’s 
relationship with Kelly, SDP employed her as a teacher at Bregy 
Elementary School in Philadelphia.  Her tenure at Bregy seems to 
have been reasonably successful for during that time her students’ 
standardized test scores improved, and she received compliments 
from Bregy’s principal and an SDP school superintendent.  
Moreover, Daniels’s principal rated her as satisfactory in all 
categories in a year-end evaluation for the 2008-09 school year.  
At the end of that school year, however, Daniels was subject to a 
forced transfer because her position was eliminated due to 
enrollment or budget allocation changes.  Accordingly, Daniels 
participated in a June 2009 site selection process for the 
upcoming school year.  She elected to teach middle-year English 
at Thomas Mifflin School, and SDP gave her that assignment.  
Her troubles with SDP began almost immediately after that 
assignment.   
  B.  Thomas Mifflin School 
 Leslie Mason was Mifflin’s principal when SDP assigned 
Daniels to that school.  On a parents’ night on or about September 
9, 2009, Mason stated that some of the teachers were old enough 
to be grandparents.  Daniels, who was the oldest teacher in the 
room, took offense to the remark and complained to Mason that 
she found the statement ageist and offensive.  Daniels contends 
that, following this incident, Mason became antagonistic toward 
her. 
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 In accordance with SDP procedures regarding new 
teachers at a school, Mason observed Daniels teach several times 
during her year at Mifflin.  Following these observations, Mason 
evaluated Daniels negatively, an assessment that Daniels contends 
was unwarranted.  For example, Mason gave Daniels a poor 
evaluation for not using technology, even though Daniels did not 
have a Smart Board in her classroom and did allow her students 
to use laptops when she considered their use to be appropriate.  
Mason also repeatedly commented on the “terrible” appearance 
of Daniels’s classroom, despite the circumstance that Daniels was 
one of just a few teachers not ordered to clean his or her 
classroom after an SDP walk-through inspection.   
 The relationship between Daniels and Mason was strained 
further because Mason often sent another teacher, Christine 
Lokey, to provide Daniels teaching support, an assignment that, in 
Daniels’s view, interfered with her teaching regimen.  Daniels did 
not ask for Lokey’s assistance, and Mason did not send Lokey to 
any other teacher’s classroom with the same frequency that she 
sent her to Daniels’s classroom.  The strain was exacerbated 
when Daniels learned from a student that Mason had called the 
student to her office to ask about Daniels’s pedagogy.   
 At the end of the 2009-10 school year, Mason reduced the 
number of budgeted middle-year teachers for the upcoming year 
from three to two, an action that required Daniels to go through 
another forced transfer process.  Although SDP’s central office, 
rather than the local principal, decides which teachers to retain 
and which to transfer, Mason told two students that she “had 
written [Daniels] out of the budget and that [Daniels] wouldn’t be 
returning in September 2010.”  App. at 124.  Even though SDP 
had made the decision to transfer Daniels months earlier, it did 
 
 6 
not notify Daniels of the decision until September 2, 2010.  
Consequently, Daniels was unable to participate in that summer’s 
site selection process.   
 Daniels sent a letter dated September 6, 2010, to SDP’s 
human resources and labor directors, complaining about Mason’s 
treatment of her.  In the letter, Daniels again complained about 
Mason’s comment from a year earlier regarding the age of certain 
of the school’s teachers.  Daniels also complained that another 
Mifflin teacher told Daniels, “They call you old school.”  Id. at 
255.  In the letter, Daniels further stated that Mason sent Lokey 
to her classroom “[a]lmost daily” and that this was not her 
practice with any other teacher.  Id. at 254.  Daniels raised the 
following additional matters in her letter:  Mason sent other 
individuals to observe her; Mason herself observed Daniels’s 
teaching at least three times and gave her negative evaluations 
based on her use of technology and classroom appearance; Mason 
would not assist Daniels in disciplining her students; Mason called 
students to her office to ask them about Daniels’s pedagogy; and 
Mason had written Daniels out of Mifflin’s budget without 
notification to Daniels notwithstanding Daniels’s repeated request 
for information about her status for the upcoming year.  Daniels 
concluded in her letter that she “experienced ageism, harassment, 
and a hostile environment continuously throughout the school 
year.”  Id. at 255. 
 The next day, September 7, 2010, Daniels met with Lissa 
Johnson, the deputy chief in SDP’s staffing office, to ascertain 
her teaching assignment for the upcoming year.  Although 
Daniels and Johnson did not reach a conclusion during the 
meeting determining Daniels’s assignment for the upcoming year, 
SDP unilaterally assigned Daniels to teach at E.H. Vare Middle 
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School.  However, Daniels did not learn of her assignment to 
Vare until September 14, a week after her meeting with Johnson. 
 Consequently, Daniels did not attend Vare on September 8, 13, 
and 14, days on which she would have been at Vare if she had 
known of her assignment to that school.  On September 13 or 14, 
Johnson directed Vare administrators to designate Daniels as on 
“unauthorized leave without pay” until she reported.  Id. at 213, 
215.  The record indicates that Johnson learned of Daniels’s 
September 6 letter on September 16, when she received an e-mail 
from one of its recipients notifying Johnson that Daniels had 
complained that Mason had harassed her. 
 Around October 28, 2010, after Daniels had started 
teaching at Vare, she filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”).1  In the complaint, 
Daniels asserted an age discrimination claim based on Mason’s 
comment at the parents’ night meeting and Mason’s frequent 
monitoring of her through Lokey and others, while younger 
teachers at Mifflin were not scrutinized similarly.  Daniels also 
asserted a race discrimination claim based on her forced transfer 
from Mifflin and Mason’s failure to give her timely notice of the 
transfer.  On December 30, 2010, Daniels amended her PHRC 
complaint to include an age discrimination claim based on the 
forced transfer.   
  C.  Vare Middle School 
 Daniels’s troubles continued at Vare, where Rachel 
                                                   
1 The record suggests that Daniels filed the complaint on 
November 1, 2010, but the parties and the District Court indicate 
that she filed the complaint on October 28, 2010.  This minor 
difference is immaterial to the outcome of the case. 
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Marianno and Kenneth Christy served as the principal and 
assistant principal, respectively.  For her first week or two at 
Vare, Daniels was not assigned to a classroom; instead, she was 
told either to remain in the main office or to go to the teachers’ 
lounge.  Moreover, even after she received a classroom 
assignment, it took weeks and repeated requests before she was 
provided with keys to her classroom.  Furthermore, Daniels was 
required to “float” among different classrooms, whereas other 
teachers did not need to do so.   
 According to Daniels, students with extreme disciplinary 
problems and academic challenges were “dumped” into her class, 
but when Daniels wrote incident reports about her students, 
Marianno and Christy would not initiate appropriate disciplinary 
action.  Indeed, they did not take disciplinary action when a 
student stood on Daniels’s desk, kicked papers onto the floor, and 
threatened to “kick [Daniels’s] ass,” conduct that led Daniels to 
file a police report.  Id. at 127.  Marianno and Christy likewise 
failed to investigate or take disciplinary action when students 
wrote threats and profanities on the window of Daniels’s 
classroom door.  In addition, Marianno refused to discipline one 
of Daniels’s students who loudly used profanity when Marianno 
observed Daniels’s class.  At some point during the year, 
Marianno told Daniels, “If you are not comfortable with the 
children of this culture perhaps you should leave.”  Id. at 126.  In 
December 2010, Marianno assigned Daniels to teach subjects for 
which Daniels did not have a certification.   
 On December 20, 2010, after Daniels had missed school 
on December 10 due to illness, Christy sent Daniels a disciplinary 
attendance memorandum.  The memorandum listed Daniels’s 
absences on September 8, 13, and 14 as “unauthorized leave 
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without pay” and warned Daniels that “additional absences or 
latenesses will lead to more severe disciplinary action.”  Id. at 
213. 
 On February 22, 2011, Daniels filed a second PHRC 
complaint, this time concerning her treatment at Vare.  In this 
complaint, Daniels alleged that Christy’s attendance 
memorandum falsely listed her as having taken “unauthorized 
leave” for a period during which she had not yet been assigned to 
Vare.  She also complained that Marianno had assigned her to 
teach subjects for which she was not certified, had not provided 
her with a permanent classroom or keys to any classroom, and 
assigned students with the worst behavioral problems and the 
lowest academic scores to her.  Daniels claimed that SDP 
retaliated against her because she had filed her October 28, 2010 
PHRC complaint.  The certificate of service of the February 22, 
2011 complaint is dated April 12, 2011.  Marianno and Christy 
each testified at depositions that they had no knowledge of 
Daniels’s PHRC complaints during the time that they took the 
adverse actions of which Daniels complains.   
 During the 2010-11 school year while Daniels was 
assigned to Vare, Daniels began seeing doctors for anxiety and 
depression, conditions that she attributed to her hostile treatment 
at school.  Starting in March 2011, Daniels began a period of 
medical leave from Vare due to her anxiety.  While Daniels was 
on leave, Marianno telephoned Daniels requesting her students’ 
grades.  After Daniels faxed her the grades, Marianno called 
again, screaming at Daniels for the grades’ low quality.  After the 
2010-11 school year ended, Daniels participated in the site 
selection process for the upcoming year, which resulted in her 
assignment to teach middle-year literacy at Penrose Elementary 
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School beginning September 2011.     
  D.  Penrose Elementary School 
 Daniels’s troubles continued at Penrose.  On September 6, 
2011, the principal at Penrose, Katherine Pendino, called Daniels 
into her office and, while reviewing Daniels’s performance 
records, asked her, “Do you know what you’re doing?”  Id. at 
129.  On or about September 12, 2011, when referring to Daniels, 
Pendino shouted in the hallway within the hearing of students, 
staff, and faculty:  “[S]he’s no good[.]  I want her out of here.”  
Id.  Similarly, two days later, Pendino stated to Daniels in front of 
her students, “[Y]ou don’t know anything.”  Id. at 130.  Pendino 
also attempted to write Daniels up for not indicating her time of 
arrival on the sign-in sheet, even though Pendino had told her that 
she did not need to do so.  Pendino likewise wrote Daniels up for 
not submitting lesson plans that Daniels actually had submitted 
weeks earlier.   
 On or about October 25, 2011, Pendino commented to the 
school’s behavior therapist that Daniels was “no good.  I want to 
get rid of her.”  Id.  During the same month, Pendino instructed 
Daniels’s students to write down anything derogatory or negative 
that Daniels had said.  When parents complained about this 
direction to their children, Daniels received another write up.  
Then, on or about November 14, 2011, Pendino told Daniels, 
“[D]o not return after Christmas break; either retire or resign.”  
Id.  As had Marianno and Christy, Pendino testified that she did 
not know of Daniels’s PHRC complaints when she took actions 
that Daniels regarded as adverse.  On December 13, 2011, 
Daniels supplemented her February 2011 PHRC complaint with a 
letter listing grievances against Pendino.  Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of 
 
 11 
Phila., 982 F. Supp. 2d 462, 475 (E.D. Pa. 2013).2   
  E.  Dispute Over Medical Leave 
 Daniels took another medical leave beginning December 
20, 2011.  During the leave, Daniels expected to receive wage 
continuation benefits, which cover 75 percent of an employee’s 
salary after the employee has exhausted other sick leave.   
 Under SDP’s leave policy, if an employee misses ten 
consecutive workdays due to personal illness, notice 
automatically is sent to Carol Kenney, SDP’s director of 
employee health services.  When Kenney’s office receives such a 
notice, it schedules an appointment for the employee with an SDP 
physician to determine whether the employee has a need for 
continued leave.  An employee who disagrees with the conclusion 
of the SDP physician can request that another physician, not in 
SDP’s employ, evaluate her.  If the employee makes such a 
request, SDP selects that physician from a list of physicians on 
which SDP and the teachers’ union previously had agreed.   
 In keeping with this policy, Kenney’s office scheduled an 
appointment for Daniels to see Dr. Aribelle Jones, an SDP 
physician, on January 18, 2012.  Although Jones is not a 
psychiatrist and, according to Daniels, merely spoke with Daniels 
without examining her, she concluded that Daniels would be fit to 
return to work on February 1, 2012.  Daniels did not accept this 
                                                   
2 Although Daniels alludes to this letter in her statement of 
disputed facts, the parties did not include the letter in the 
appendix, and Daniels does not rely on it in her brief.  In any 
event, as we explain below, this letter does not affect the outcome 
of this case. 
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evaluation and consequently requested that a physician not in 
SDP’s employ evaluate her.  Accordingly, SDP scheduled an 
appointment for her for this purpose with a psychiatrist, Dr. 
Burton Weiss, from the Penn Diagnostic Center. 
 Before Daniels’s appointment with Weiss, Kenney wrote a 
letter to him with “background information” about Daniels to the 
effect that she had taken sick leave the previous school year and 
had “stated that she was not supported by the principal at her last 
school.”  Id. at 244.  Kenney also wrote that Daniels “went out 
again on sick leave in December 2011 with the same complaints 
of being harassed by her new principal.”  Id. at 244.  The letter 
asked that Weiss specifically opine on whether Daniels should 
have returned to work on February 1, 2012. 
 Weiss examined Daniels on February 13, 2012, and, two 
days later, he wrote a letter to Kenney opining:  “Ms. Daniels’s 
symptoms of anxiety and depression arise from her dispute with 
the Principal and not from a definable psychiatric illness.  Her 
problem is legal and administrative, not psychiatric.”  Id. at 247.  
He therefore determined that Daniels should have returned to 
work on February 1, 2012, reasoning that psychiatric treatment 
would not solve the source of her distress.   
 On February 21, 2012, Kenney notified Daniels of Weiss’s 
conclusion and informed her that if she did not return to work on 
February 27, 2012, SDP would institute disciplinary proceedings 
against her.  In reliance on Weiss’s determination, Kenney also 
denied Daniels wage continuation benefits.  Daniels, however, did 
not return to work as directed.  Rather, based on the opinion of 
her own physicians, Daniels did not return to work until March 
27, 2012.  Due to Daniels’s failure to return to work as directed, 
Kenney, who testified that she did not know at that time of 
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Daniels’s PHRC complaints, recommended that SDP terminate 
her employment.  On May 2, 2012, Daniels received notice that 
SDP had initiated the proceedings that ultimately led to the 
termination of her employment.   
  F.  Present Lawsuit 
 On May 22, 2012, Daniels filed suit in the District Court 
against SDP, Mason, Marianno, Christy, and Pendino, asserting 
claims of age discrimination, race discrimination, and retaliation.  
Defendants made a partially successful motion for summary 
judgment as the Court granted the motion in an order entered 
November 7, 2013, with respect to most of Daniels’s claims, 
including those of retaliation.  See Daniels, 982 F. Supp. 2d at 
490.  The remainder of the case proceeded to trial, at which the 
jury returned a verdict in defendants’ favor.  The Court entered a 
final judgment on November 22, 2013.  Daniels then moved to 
alter the judgment and for a new trial, but the Court denied that 
motion on January 29, 2014.  Daniels appeals but limits her 
appeal to challenging the November 7, 2013 order for summary 
judgment with respect to her retaliation claims against SDP in 
violation of the ADEA, Title VII, and the PHRA.3  
 
III.  STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND STANDARD 
OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had original federal question 
jurisdiction over Daniels’s ADEA and Title VII claims pursuant to 
                                                   
3 Daniels does not include the individual defendants as appellees 
on this appeal. 
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29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), 
respectively, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  It had 
supplemental jurisdiction over Daniels’s PHRA claim pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s order 
for summary judgment.  Budhun v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 
765 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 2014).  To warrant summary 
judgment, the movant must show that, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Williams 
v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 758 (3d Cir. 
2004).  “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support 
of the [nonmovant’s] position will be insufficient; there must be 
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the 
[nonmovant].”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986). 
 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
 The ADEA prohibits an employer from discriminating 
against an employee with respect to “compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s age,” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a); Title VII prohibits 
discrimination in employment on the basis of an employee’s race, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); and the PHRA prohibits discrimination in 
employment based on both age and race, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
955(a).  All three statutes also make it unlawful for an employer 
to retaliate against an employee for either “oppos[ing] any 
practice” made unlawful by their respective provisions or for 
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participating “in any manner” in an investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing under their respective provisions.  29 U.S.C. § 623(d); 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 955(d). 
 Daniels asserts retaliation claims under each of these 
statutes.  We address these claims together as the circumstances 
of this case do not require that we make differing analyses.  See 
Barber v. CSX Distribution Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 698 (3d Cir. 
1995) (“Because the prohibition against age discrimination 
contained in the ADEA is similar in text, tone, and purpose to the 
prohibition against discrimination contained in Title VII, courts 
routinely look to law developed under Title VII to guide an 
inquiry under the ADEA.”); Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 
417, 432 (3d Cir. 2013) (treating plaintiff’s PHRA claims as 
identical to her ADEA and Title VII claims).  In particular, we 
consider Daniels’s claims in this case, in which there is not direct 
evidence of retaliation, using the burden-shifting framework that 
the Supreme Court announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973).  See, e.g., Moore v. 
City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 2006) (Title 
VII); Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 188 (3d Cir. 2005) (ADEA 
and PHRA). 
 Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff 
asserting a retaliation claim first must establish a prima facie case 
by showing “(1) [that she engaged in] protected employee 
activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either after or 
contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) 
a causal connection between the employee’s protected activity 
and the employer’s adverse action.”  Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 
497 F.3d 286, 300 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Fogleman v. Mercy 
Hosp. Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567-68 (3d Cir. 2002)).  If the plaintiff 
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makes these showings, the burden of production of evidence 
shifts to the employer to present a legitimate, non-retaliatory 
reason for having taken the adverse action.  Id.  If the employer 
advances such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that “the employer’s proffered explanation was 
false, and that retaliation was the real reason for the adverse 
employment action.”  Id. (quoting Moore, 461 F.3d at 342).  
Although the burden of production of evidence shifts back and 
forth, the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of persuasion at all 
times.  Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 
143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106 (2000).  Using this rubric, we 
conclude that Daniels cannot support her claims of retaliation and 
the District Court correctly granted summary judgment against 
her. 
  A.  Protected Activity 
   For purposes of the first prong of a prima facie case of 
retaliation, protected “opposition” activity includes not only an 
employee’s filing of formal charges of discrimination against an 
employer but also “informal protests of discriminatory 
employment practices, including making complaints to 
management.”  Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, 
Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Sumner v. 
U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990)); see 
Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 
U.S. 271, 276, 129 S.Ct. 846, 851 (2009) (“‘When an employee 
communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has 
engaged in . . . a form of employment discrimination, that 
communication’ virtually always ‘constitutes the employee’s 
opposition to the activity.’” (alteration in original)).  That is, in 
determining whether a plaintiff adequately opposed 
 
 17 
discrimination, “we look to the message . . . conveyed [by a 
plaintiff’s conduct] rather than the means of conveyance.”  
Moore, 461 F.3d at 343 (quoting Curay-Cramer, 450 F.3d at 
135).  The complaint must allege that the opposition was to 
discrimination based on a protected category, such as age or race. 
 See Slagle v. Cnty. of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 266-67 (3d Cir. 
2006); Barber, 68 F.3d at 702.  Furthermore, although a plaintiff 
in a retaliation case “need not prove the merits of the underlying 
discrimination complaint,” she must have “act[ed] under a good 
faith, reasonable belief that a violation existed.”  Moore, 461 F.3d 
at 344 (quoting Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 
1074, 1085 (3d Cir. 1996)).  This standard requires an 
“objectively reasonable belief” that the activity the plaintiff 
opposed constituted unlawful discrimination under the relevant 
statute.  Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 
F.3d 315, 322 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Moore, 461 F.3d at 341). 
 In Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 
270, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 1509 (2001) (per curiam), the Supreme 
Court rejected a plaintiff’s retaliation claim as the Court 
concluded that no reasonable person could have believed that the 
conduct of which she had complained constituted sex 
discrimination under Title VII.  The plaintiff had complained 
about an incident in which, while she was reviewing job 
applicants with a male supervisor and another male employee, the 
supervisor commented to her that he did not understand a 
sexually explicit statement that one of the applicants had made.  
At that time, the other male employee responded, “Well, I’ll tell 
you later,” and both men chuckled.  Id. at 269-70, 121 S.Ct. at 
1509.  The Court noted that “simple teasing, offhand comments, 
and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount 
to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of 
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employment’” so as to violate Title VII, and held that the single 
incident described in that case could not remotely satisfy this 
standard.  Id. at 271, 121 S.Ct. at 1510 (quoting Faragher v. City 
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 2283 (1998)). 
 Accordingly, the plaintiff’s complaint about this incident did not 
qualify as protected activity.  See id. at 270, 121 S.Ct. at 1509. 
 Daniels asserts that she engaged in the following instances 
of protected conduct: (1) she complained to Mason about 
Mason’s grandparents comment during the parents’ night 
meeting; (2) she complained to Mason about excessive 
monitoring that other teachers did not experience; (3) she sent the 
September 6, 2010 letter to SDP administrators claiming that she 
had been subjected to a hostile work environment because of her 
age; (4) she filed the October 2010 PHRC complaint and the 
December 2010 amendment to that complaint, in which she 
claimed age and race discrimination based on the hostile work 
environment she experienced at Mifflin and her forced transfer 
from that school; and (5) she filed the February 2011 PHRC 
complaint claiming that Marianno and Christy had retaliated 
against her at Vare for engaging in protected activities.    
 Our review satisfies us that Daniels cannot show that the 
first two of these activities constituted protected conduct, but that 
she can make that showing with respect to the last three 
activities.  First, Daniels’s complaint to Mason about the 
grandparents comment is not a protected activity because no 
reasonable person could believe that Mason’s statement, by itself, 
constituted unlawful age discrimination.  Daniels complained that 
it was ageist and offensive for Mason to state publicly that some 
of the teachers are old enough to be grandparents.  However, the 
term “grandparents” is not inherently derogatory, and Mason’s 
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isolated “offhand comment” did not name Daniels or any other 
teacher or explicitly denigrate the ability of older teachers to 
perform their duties.  See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271, 121 S.Ct. at 
1510; cf. Kargbo v. Phila. Corp. for Aging, 16 F. Supp. 3d 512, 
532 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“[The supervisor’s] comments about 
Plaintiff’s age are more serious than the single off-color remark in 
Breeden because they were explicitly directed at Plaintiff and 
referred to his ability to do his job.”).  Contrary to Daniels’s 
contention, her subjective belief that Mason’s statement violated 
the ADEA does not suffice for her complaint to qualify as 
protected conduct.  See Curay-Cramer, 450 F.3d at 137 (“[The 
plaintiff’s] subjective state of mind is . . . irrelevant for purposes 
of determining whether she engaged in protected conduct.”). 
 Likewise, with respect to her second alleged category of 
protected conduct, Daniels does not point to any evidence in the 
record showing that she made complaints to Mason about 
excessive monitoring.  Moreover, she fails to demonstrate that 
she related her complaints to age or race discrimination such that 
the complaints could have qualified as protected activity under 
the anti-discrimination statutes.  See Slagle, 435 F.3d at 268 
(holding that plaintiff’s “vague allegations of ‘civil rights’ 
violations,” without reference to discrimination based on any 
protected category, did not constitute protected conduct under 
Title VII); Barber, 68 F.3d at 702 (holding that plaintiff’s 
“general complaint of unfair treatment d[id] not translate into a 
charge of illegal age discrimination” under the ADEA).  In 
considering what activities constitute protected conduct, we 
emphasize that anti-discrimination employment statutes are not 
intended to establish general standards for conduct of employers 
in dealing with employees.  See Curay-Cramer, 450 F.3d at 135; 
Slagle, 435 F.3d at 266-67; Barber, 68 F.3d at 702.  
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 But even though Daniels cannot successfully predicate a 
claim based on her first two categories of what she claims was 
protected conduct, she has made a showing sufficient to satisfy 
the first prong of her prima facie case based on the other three 
categories of such conduct.  In her September 6, 2010 letter, 
Daniels complained not only of Mason’s “ageis[t]” comment and 
her fellow teacher’s reference to her as “old school” but also of 
the frequent monitoring of her teaching and classroom 
preparation, the lack of assistance in disciplining her students, 
Mason’s negative written evaluations, Mason’s questioning of 
students about her pedagogy, and the failure of Mason or SDP to 
inform her of her teaching status for the upcoming school year 
despite her repeated requests for such information.  App. at 254-
55.  Toward the end of the letter, Daniels summarized her 
complaints by stating that she “experienced ageism, harassment, 
and a hostile work environment throughout the school year.”  Id. 
at 255.  Daniels reasonably and in good faith could have believed 
that such pervasive harassment constituted unlawful age 
discrimination, and a factfinder could conclude that the letter 
alleged age discrimination in terms sufficient to qualify the 
sending of the letter as protected conduct under the ADEA and 
the PHRA.  Furthermore, Daniels’s formal complaints to the 
PHRC containing similar allegations of mistreatment based on 
age, race, and prior protected conduct unquestionably qualify as 
protected activities.  See Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 
913, 920 (3d Cir. 1997); Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 
(3d Cir. 1989).  We therefore turn to the second prong of 
Daniels’s prima facie case. 
  B.  Adverse Action 
 For an employer’s action to satisfy the second prong of a 
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prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff “must show that a 
reasonable employee would have found the challenged action 
materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have 
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a 
charge of discrimination.”  Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 
White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); accord Moore, 461 F.3d at 341.  We 
examine the challenged conduct “from the perspective of a 
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all the 
circumstances.’”  Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 
71, 126 S.Ct. at 2417 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81, 118 S.Ct. 998, 1003 (1998)).  
“[P]etty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good 
manners” generally will not suffice.  Id. at 68, 126 S.Ct. at 2415.  
However, “[c]ontext matters” such that “an act that would be 
immaterial in some situations is material in others.”  Id. at 69, 126 
S.Ct. at 2415-16 (quoting Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 
420 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 Daniels alleges that SDP engaged in numerous instances of 
adverse conduct: (1) her forced transfer from Mifflin in the 
summer of 2010 and SDP’s failure to inform her of the transfer in 
time for her to participate in that year’s site selection process; (2) 
the designation of her absences on September 8, 13, and 14, 
2010, as “unauthorized leave without pay,” even though SDP did 
not notify her of her assignment to Vare until September 14, and 
Christy’s related memorandum of December 20, 2010, warning 
Daniels that additional absences or lateness would lead to more 
severe disciplinary action; (3) the hostile work environment that 
Daniels experienced at Vare and Penrose from September 2010 
to December 2011, which caused her mental health injuries; (4) 
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the denial of her wage continuation benefits; and (5) SDP’s 
eventual termination of her employment. 
 We need not consider the first alleged instance of adverse 
action as Daniels’s forced transfer without notification preceded 
her first protected activity — the September 6, 2010 letter to 
SDP administrators — and therefore was not “after or 
contemporaneous with” her protected conduct.  See Marra, 497 
F.3d at 300; Slagle, 435 F.3d at 266.  Each of the other instances 
of adverse action, however, occurred after Daniels’s first 
protected activity, and each could have dissuaded a reasonable 
person in her position from charging discrimination.  
Consequently, they satisfy the second prong of her prima facie 
case.  See, e.g., Moore, 461 F.3d at 348 (“pattern of harassment” 
sufficed); LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 
F.3d 217, 232 (3d Cir. 2007) (termination of employment clearly 
suffices); Abramson v. William Paterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (same).  Thus, as is often true in retaliation cases, this 
case turns on whether the plaintiff, here Daniels, can establish 
that there was a causal connection between her protected 
activities and SDP’s adverse actions. 
  C.  Causal Connection 
 “We consider ‘a broad array of evidence’ in determining 
whether a sufficient causal link exists [for a plaintiff] to survive a 
motion for summary judgment.”   LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 232 
(quoting Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 284 (3d 
Cir. 2000)).  To demonstrate a link between protected activity and 
an employer’s adverse action, a plaintiff may rely on the temporal 
proximity between the two if “unusually suggestive.”  Id.; Marra, 
497 F.3d at 302.  In the absence of such a close temporal 
proximity, we consider the circumstances as a whole, including 
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any intervening antagonism by the employer, inconsistencies in the 
reasons the employer gives for its adverse action, and any other 
evidence suggesting that the employer had a retaliatory animus 
when taking the adverse action.  See LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 232-
33; Marra, 497 F.3d at 302; Farrell, 206 F.3d at 280-81.  The 
plaintiff, however, cannot establish that there was a causal 
connection without some evidence that the individuals responsible 
for the adverse action knew of the plaintiff’s protected conduct at 
the time they acted.  See Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 650 
(3d Cir. 2007); Moore, 461 F.3d at 351; cf. Ambrose v. Twp. of 
Robinson, 303 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2002) (“It is only intuitive 
that for protected conduct to be a substantial or motiving factor in 
a decision, the decisionmakers must be aware of the protected 
conduct.”). 
 Daniels did not proffer sufficient evidence of causation to 
survive SDP’s motion for summary judgment.  As to the adverse 
action with respect to Daniels’s classification for September 8, 
13, and 14, 2010, Johnson, then deputy chief in SDP’s staffing 
office, on September 13 or 14 directed that Daniels be designated 
as having taken “unauthorized leave without pay.”  App. at 215.  
These absences then triggered Christy’s December 20, 2010 
attendance memorandum following Daniels’s absence ten days 
earlier.  The record, however, does not contain any evidence that 
Johnson learned of Daniels’s September 6, 2010 letter until 
September 16, 2010, when she received an e-mail referencing 
that complaint (but not mentioning its claim of age 
discrimination).4  Id. at 216.  Likewise, Christy testified at his 
                                                   
4 Johnson’s response to that e-mail does note that on September 
13, 2010, Daniels “made allegations against Leslie Mason” during 
a telephone call with Johnson.  App. at 215.  However, the record 
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deposition that he had no knowledge of Daniels’s complaints.  
Daniels offers nothing to rebut this evidence that the decision 
makers respectively responsible for her designation as having 
taken “unauthorized leave without pay” and the subsequent 
warning lacked knowledge of her protected conduct.  She 
therefore cannot establish that there was a causal connection 
between her protected activities and such adverse action.  See 
Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 801 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(per curiam); Ambrose, 303 F.3d at 493. 
 Daniels similarly cannot establish that there was a causal 
connection between her protected activities and the hostile work 
environment that she allegedly experienced from September 2010 
to December 2011.  The persons responsible for this alleged 
harassment, Marianno and Christy at Vare and Pendino at 
Penrose, all testified that they lacked knowledge of Daniels’s 
protected conduct.  As the basis for establishing such knowledge, 
Daniels points to the unexplained hostility of these individuals 
toward her immediately upon her arrival at each of the schools.  
We recognize that when there is a brief period of time between an 
adverse actor’s learning of a plaintiff’s protected conduct and a 
subsequent adverse action, it may be reasonable to infer that there 
was a causal link between the two events.  But the temporal 
proximity of adverse action to protected conduct does not 
establish that the adverse actor had knowledge of the protected 
conduct before acting.  See Moore, 461 F.3d at 351-52; Ambrose, 
303 F.3d at 493.   
 Furthermore, Daniels cannot justifiably rely on mere 
                                                                                                                  
does not contain any evidence regarding the content of those 
allegations, and Daniels does not cite this conversation as an 
instance of protected activity. 
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speculation that these adverse actors learned of her complaints 
from other employees in the school district.  See Sarullo, 352 
F.3d at 799 (rejecting plaintiff’s speculation that adverse actor 
learned of plaintiff’s race through office “grapevine,” where their 
offices were located miles apart).  A factfinder potentially could 
infer that Marianno and Christy knew of Daniels’s February 2011 
PHRC complaint because it contained specific allegations against 
them, but Daniels contends that Marianno and Christy began their 
harassment of her months earlier, at the start of the school year in 
September 2010.  She therefore cannot link such hostile treatment 
to their knowledge of this complaint.  See LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 
233-34 (no causation where plaintiff’s tense relationship with her 
supervisor began prior to her protected activity); cf. Breeden, 532 
U.S. at 272, 121 S.Ct. at 1511 (no causal link between plaintiff’s 
lawsuit and her subsequent transfer where employer “concededly 
was contemplating the transfer before it learned of the suit”). 
 Daniels fares only slightly better with respect to the last 
two alleged instances of adverse action.  Kenney, SDP’s director 
of employee health services, was responsible both for denying 
Daniels’s wage continuation benefits and for subsequently 
recommending her termination.  Although Kenney testified that 
she did not know of Daniels’s PHRC complaints, Daniels has 
presented evidence to rebut this testimony.  For example, in her 
letter to Weiss, Kenney noted that Daniels had complained of 
harassment by her principals, suggesting that Kenney knew of 
Daniels’s conflicts with SDP, including her retaliation claims.   
 Nevertheless, Daniels fails to establish a causal link 
between her protected activities and these adverse actions.  She 
has not shown an “unusually suggestive” temporal proximity as 
ten months passed between the service of the February 2011 
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PHRC complaint on SDP on April 12, 2011, and the denial of her 
wage continuation benefits in February 2012.  See LeBoon, 503 
F.3d at 233 (“Although there is no bright line rule as to what 
constitutes unduly suggestive temporal proximity, a gap of three 
months between the protected activity and the adverse action, 
without more, cannot create an inference of causation and defeat 
summary judgment.”); Andreoli, 482 F.3d at 650 (holding five-
month time period between complaint and first adverse action 
insufficient by itself to support inference of causation).  
Moreover, Daniels cannot rely on the intervening antagonism she 
allegedly faced because, as discussed above, she cannot show 
that there was a causal relationship between her protected 
conduct and this antagonism. 
 When we take into account Daniels’s December 13, 2011 
supplement to her February PHRC complaint, we perhaps could 
conclude that Daniels made a prima facie showing of causation 
between her protected activities and the adverse action given that 
only three months passed between the filing of the supplement 
and the denial of her wage continuation benefits.  After all, 
Daniels’s medical leave began soon after she submitted this 
supplement, and it took that long for SDP to go through the 
formal process of obtaining examinations of Daniels by Jones and 
Weiss.  See Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 
178 (3d Cir. 1997) (“When there may be valid reasons why the 
adverse employment action was not taken immediately, the 
absence of immediacy between the cause and effect does not 
disprove causation.”).  Yet even assuming Daniels can make such 
a prima facie showing, SDP has proffered legitimate reasons for 
these adverse actions, which Daniels has failed to rebut.  See 
Estate of Oliva ex rel. McHugh v. New Jersey, 604 F.3d 788, 
799-800 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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 According to SDP, it denied the wage continuation 
benefits based on Weiss’s determination that Daniels was fit to 
return to work, and then terminated her employment because she 
failed to return in a timely way.  To avoid summary judgment 
once the employer has articulated legitimate reasons for its 
adverse actions, “the plaintiff must point to some evidence, direct 
or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either 
(1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) 
believe that an invidious [retaliatory] reason was more likely than 
not a . . . determinative cause of the employer’s action.”  Fuentes 
v. Perksie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994).  The plaintiff “cannot 
simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or 
mistaken” but rather “must demonstrate such ‘weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or contradictions in 
the employer’s proffered legitimate reason for its action that a 
reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of 
credence, and hence infer that the employer did not act for [the 
asserted] nondiscriminatory reasons.’”  Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 
185, 194 n.13 (3d Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 331 (3d Cir. 
1995)). 
 Daniels challenges SDP’s reliance on Weiss’s 
determination that she could return to work, pointing to evidence 
that her own physicians did not consider her fit to return and 
disputing the basis of Weiss’s conclusion to the contrary.  
Daniels’s argument mirrors an argument that we rejected in Estate 
of Oliva, 604 F.3d at 801.  There, the plaintiff challenged as 
retaliatory the defendant’s determination that he could return to 
full duty status, a conclusion that was contrary to his own 
physicians’ recommendations.  See id.  The defendant responded 
that he reasonably had relied on a determination of fitness for 
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duty made by an independent medical center.  See id.  We agreed 
that the defendant legitimately could rely on that independent 
medical evaluation, notwithstanding its inconsistency with the 
plaintiff’s own physicians’ opinion, and therefore we affirmed an 
order for summary judgment in the defendant’s favor.  See id.  
SDP likewise reasonably relied on Weiss’s opinion particularly 
because he was an independent physician not within its employ.  It 
does not matter that this opinion differed from that of Daniels’s 
physicians.  Nor does it matter whether, as Daniels argues, this 
opinion was mistaken.  See Ross, 755 F.3d at 194 & n.13; 
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 766-67. 
 Daniels also asserts that Weiss was biased in favor of 
SDP.  However, nothing in the record, including Kenney’s letter 
to Weiss, suggests that SDP improperly influenced him when he 
stated his opinion, and Daniels cannot rest on mere speculation of 
bias.  See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 766 (declaring that plaintiff’s 
allegation of bias “amount[ed] to little more than the 
schoolground retort, ‘Not so,’” and “d[id] not create a material 
issue of fact”).  Indeed, the teachers’ union could have sought to 
have Weiss removed from the pool of independent physicians if it 
considered him biased in SDP’s favor, but the record does not 
contain any evidence that it took such action.  Moreover, Daniels 
does not contend in her brief that she personally or through 
counsel objected to Weiss evaluating her.  Although SDP may 
have harassed Daniels, she has not linked any of the harassment 
to the sort of retaliatory animus necessary to obtain relief under 
the anti-discrimination statutes on which she relies.  See Moore, 
461 F.3d at 342 (“Many may suffer . . . harassment at work, but if 
the reason for that harassment is one that is not proscribed by 
Title VII, [the ADEA, or the PHRA,] it follows that [those 
statutes] provide[] no relief.” (first alteration in original) (quoting 
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Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 449 (3d Cir.2006). 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of SDP entered on 
November 8, 2013.  
